Uang Kertas Adalah Trik Yahudi untuk Menguasai Dunia

 

 

Dahulu, kita mengenal sistem jual beli yang dinamakan Barter sebagai cikal bakal alat tukar yang sekarang kita kenal dengan sebutan uang. Dalam sedikit sekali buku sejarah SMP dapat ditemui, setelah masa-masa pertukaran barang dengan barang, masa berikutnya menceritakan tentang alat tukar lain yang dikonversi dalam bentuk emas. Sistem pertukaran ini dilakukan karena emas dianggap logam mulia yang langka dan tidak bersifat radioaktif (alasan yang telah dirumuskan oleh para ahli).

Emas Logam Mulia

Dengan kedua kategori tersebut, terkumpullah 4 unsur: radium, paladium, platinum, dan emas. Radium dan Paladium baru ditemukan pada akhir abad ke-18, dimana proses jual beli telah terjadi jutaan tahun sebelumnya, jadi menyingkirlah kedua unsur ini dari kandidat utama. Kemudian, Platinum. Seperti yang kita ketahui, Platinum hanya dapat meleleh dan dibentuk pada suhu 16000C, dimana teknologi terkini tidak dapat melakukannya secara efisien dan berbudget murah. Karena itulah emas tampil sebagai satu-satunya logam yang didaulat menjadi alat tukar.

Platina

Namun, seiring berjalannya waktu, alat tukar emas pun ditinggalkan dan diganti dengan lembaran-lembaran kertas bernominal dengan alasan efektifitas dan kelangkaan emas. Benarkah begini kenyataannya? Sayang sekali buku sejarah kita tidak menuliskan cerita alasan peralihan tersebut. Saya akan berusaha menjabarkannya satu persatu agar kita semua paham, ada sebuah konspirasi mengerikan dibaliknya.

Tahukah teman-teman bahwa kaum Yahudi dahulu dilarang memiliki tanah disebagian besar penjuru dunia? Tentu saja ada ingatan menggelitik tentang hal ini, bahwa sesuai janji Allah, mereka tidak akan mendapatkan tempat dimanapun di Bumi ini setelah peristiwa pembangkangan mereka terhadap nabi Musa As. Namun kita juga harus cermat memahami sejarah, bahwa mereka adalah kaum yang dikaruniai akal yang cerdas dan keahlian yang luar biasa banyak. Karena itulah mereka tidak kehabisan cara untuk tetap menjaga eksistensi kaum mereka. Sejak saat larangan memiliki tanah di Eropa bagi kaum Yahudi dikeluarkan, mereka menjadi kaum terpinggirkan yang tidak memiliki rumah dan harapan. Karena itu mereka memilih menjadi penyedia jasa untuk memenuhi kebutuhan sehari-hari mereka. Jasa apakah yang mereka pilih? Mereka memilih menjadi penjual jasa penyimpanan emas.

Pilihan yang menakjubkan, karena ini berarti, mereka dapat menggunakan emas emas yang mereka dapatkan untuk kembali melipatgandakannya dengan berbagai cara. Seperti yang telah kita ketahui sebelumnya, mereka memang bangsa yang cerdas, namun juga licik. Mulai saat itu, mereka mulai dikenal dengan nama goldsmith.

Mereka memulai dengan memberikan sertifikat atas tanda bukti penyerahan emas yang dilakukan orang-orang kepada mereka. Semakin banyak orang yang menabung, semakin banyak sertifikat yang mereka keluarkan dan semakin banyak emas yang mereka timbun. Para pemilik emas hanya tinggal menukarkan sertifikat mereka apabila mereka ingin mengambil emas. Hasilnya, karena banyak sekali orang kaya, emas milik masyarakat tertimbun di gudang penyimpanan Yahudi, sementara kebutuhan masyarakat atas alat tukar sudah mulai tergantikan dengan sertifikat-sertifikat yang mereka miliki. Inilah cikal bakal uang kertas yang beredar hari ini.

Karena banyaknya emas yang tertimbun, mulailah kaum yahudi memikirkan cara lain untuk mendapatkan uang. Mereka menyediakan jasa peminjaman. Dengan emas dari para investor, mereka menggunakannya untuk meminjamkan kembali dengan imbalan berlipat. Inilah yang kelak akan kita kenal dengan bunga. Kaum yahudi hanya tinggal menyerahkan sertifikat kepada para peminjam dan menerima emas sebagai pengembalian pinjaman. Hasilnya? Ini menjadi bisnis paling menguntungkan sepanjang sejarah manusia.

tdk heran BANK dengan praktek RIBA sudah marak dan sangat jelas, karena yg menciptakan sistem RIBA mereka Yahudi, atas dasar hawa nafsu untuk mencari keuntungan yg besar dgn cara bathil. (Baca juga: cara kaum Illuminati melakukan propaganda lewat media massa.)

Seiring dengan berjalannya waktu, semakin banyak orang yang menjadi debitor. Mereka rela antri duduk di bangku panjang untuk mendapatkan pinjaman dari goldsmith. Bangku panjang (banque) tempat duduk para calon debitor itu yang kemudian menjadi cikal bakal istilah BANK. Dalam waktu tidak terlalu lama, para goldsmith menjadi orang-orang terkaya di dunia.

Para bangsawan dan para raja yang serakah membutuhkan dana untuk membiaya tentara, dan belanja pegawainya. Mereka pun tidak bisa menghindar untuk menjadi mangsa para goldsmith yang kemudian berganti istilah menjadi banker (pemilik bangku). Sekali meminjam, nilainya jutaan kali pinjaman yang diterima individu-individu, dan begitu juga keuntungan yang didapatkan banker.
Para banker itu senang denggan sifat serakah para raja dan bangsawan yang suka berperang memperebutkan kekuasaan. Semakin serakah mereka, semakin banyak perang yang dijalaninya dan itu berarti semakin banyak pinjaman yang bisa diberikan para banker.

Dalam banyak kasus, ketika perdamaian terjadi, para banker justru menjadi provokator politik untuk memicu peperangan. Diantara perang yang mereka rancang adalah demi tujuan emas semata. Sebut saja Perang Dunia I dan Perang Dunia II.

Setelah perang, para pemimpin dan sekaligus juga rakyat negara-negara yang terlibat perang menjadi sapi perahan para bankir atas hutang yang mereka tanggung. Selanjutnya, selain mendapatkan keuntungan materi yang tiada tara, banker juga mendapatkan keuntungan politik yang besar. Mereka dapat dengan mudah mengangkat seseorang menjadi penguasa semudah mereka menjatuhkannya dari kekuasaan. Dan semakin besar kekuasaan politik mereka, semakin besar pula keuntungan ekonomi mereka. Politik dan uang, dua sisi mata uang yang sama, semuanya telah dimiliki para banker.

Sistem perbankan yang berlaku saat ini adalah sistem yang sama dengan sistem perbankan goldsmith, dengan kualitas dan kuantitas yang jauh lebih besar. Contohnya bank kini bahkan tidak perlu lagi mengeluarkan uang kertas atau sertifikat untuk memberikan pinjaman.

Cukup dengan sebuah entry di komputer alias dengan udara kosong (abab istilah Jawanya) maka kredit sudah diberikan. Dan kemudian, para debitor harus membayar dengan darah dan keringat atas abab yang diberikan banker. Jika gagal membayar, harta bendanya disita oleh bankir sebagaimana dialami jutaan debitor sub-prime mortgage di Amerika akhir-akhir ini.

Para bankir internasional saat ini adalah keturunan para goldsmith jaman dahulu. Sebagian besar bank di dunia, termasuk Indonesia, adalah milik para bankir internasional itu.

Pada suatu saat para banker itu bosan dengan tumpukan uang kertas yang menumpuk di gudang mereka setelah sebelumnya persediaan emas dunia kering tersedot ke brankas mereka kecuali sebagian kecil yang dipakai masyarakat sebagai perhiasan.

Mereka ingin pembayaran riel: properti, tanah, emas, asset-asset perusahaan dan sebagainya. Maka mereka menghentikan suplai uang kertas dan menarik yang sudah beredar. Istilahnya kebijakan tight money. Dunia pun mengalami krisis finansial yang merembet ke seluruh sektor ekonomi. Perusahaan-perusahaan bangkrut, debitor-debitor tidak dapat membayar hutangnya, saham perusahaan-perusahaan anjlok.

Saat inilah para bankir itu menjalankan rencananya: memborong perusahaan-perusahaan yang bangkrut, saham-saham perusahaan yang anjlok, dan menyita harta benda debitor yang gagal bayar. Maka dalam waktu singkat terjadi pemindahan kekayaan besar-besaran dari masyarakat ke kas para banker. Dan dalam situasi itu, mereka dengan bersembunyi di balik jubah IMF dan Bank Dunia, datang menawarkan “bantuan” yang sebenarnya berupa kredit berbunga ganda yang mencekik leher dan hanya membuat manusia semakin jatuh dalam cengkeraman kekuasaan mereka.

Hal inilah yang terjadi pada fenomena Depresi Besar tahun 1930-an, Krisis Moneter tahun 1997 dan Krisis Finansial Global saat ini. Bahkan saat ini AMERIKA pun tak luput dari tipu daya segelintir orang tersebut. Amerika Serikat diambang resesi. Dengan utangnya yang mencapai $ 14,3 triliun dollar atau setara dengan 100 persen dari PDB-nya. Persetujuan Kongres tentang kenaikan utang, yang menyelamatkan Amerika Serikat dari gagal bayar (default), tak mendapat sambutan positif di seluruh pasar bursa saham. Nilai perdagangan di bursa saham, semuanya rontok, dan berimbas ke seluruh dunia.

Tak dapat dipungkiri, emas adalah pondasi sebuah kekuasaan. Tiga rencana besar masa penjajah yang datang ke Indonesia, dimana dapat kita temukan pada buku-buku sejarah adalah : gold (emas), glory (kejayaan), dan gospel (menyebarkan agama). Pada mulanya mereka menguasai sistem perekonomian kita, kemudian mereka akan mendapati diri mereka berjaya diatas dunia, bahkan antek-antek perdamaian yang bersembunyi dibalik topeng PBB adalah boneka mereka. Sejatinya, merekalah yang menjadi pemimpin dunia saat ini, karena dunia bungkam dan enggan melawan mereka. Setelah kejayaan mereka peroleh, dengan mudahnya mereka akan menanamkan pikiran-pikiran menyesatkan mengenai ajaran yang kita kenal dengan sebutan illuminati atau freemason.
jangan heran mengapa di mata uang kertas 1 Dollar ada Lambang illuminati 

Lambang Illuminati dalam Uang Satu Dollar

Manusia semakin terjebak dalam kefanaan dan kebohongan, melalui emas kemerdekaan pikiran kita dijajah dan kini… masihkah kalian berfikir untuk memakai sistem-sistem yang mereka ciptakan untuk menguasai kita?

apakah anda berpikir, anda sudah merdeka dari penjajahan ? tidak , kembali ke tujuan utama mereka yaitu exploitasi (GOLD-kekayaan) tambang yg berlimpah ruah, bisa anda hitung tambang di negara ini dikelola oleh negara berapa % dibanding negara lain.

Peta Tambang Migas Beserta Negara Pemiliknya di Indonesia

Maka, sudah saatnya kita menjadikan sistem mereka sebagai bumerang yang akan menghancurkan mereka pada akhirnya, karena mereka kini sudah menjadi antek-antek setan untuk menyesatkan manusia. Tidakkah kalian ingat firman Allah dalam QS Al-Hijr: 39-40?

“Iblis berkata: “Ya Tuhanku, oleh sebab Engkau telah memutuskan bahwa aku sesat, pasti aku akan menjadikan mereka memandang baik perbuatan maksiat di muka bumi dan pasti aku akan menyesatkan mereka semuanya. Kecuali hamba-hamba yang engkau beri petunjuk diantara mereka.”

Terkadang kita lupa dan terlalu sibuk memikirkan musuh yang tampak dihadapan mata namun kita lengah dengan hasutan dan bisikan setan yang membuat kita terbuai dengan keadaan dan enggan menyingsingkan lengan untuk berperang.

Percayakah kalian, bahwa 14 abad yang lalu, pada zaman Rasulullah SAW seekor kambing dihargai dengan 1-2 dinar. Dan hari ini, seekor kambing pun dapat kita beli dengan harga 1-2 dinar juga. Emas tidak akan berkurang nilainya, jika harga emas dalam rupiah berkurang, maka harga kebutuhan sehari-hari disekitar kita pasti mengalami penurunan.

Pintar sekali bukan? Mereka mereka membuat teori baru dalam sistem ekonomi yang rumit mengatakan bahwa kemampuan jual-beli suatu negara mengakibatkan inflasi atau deflasi nilai mata uang. Padahal yang terjadi hanyalah mereka menghentikan peredaran uang kertas dan membuat semua orang berada dalam himpitan ekonomi.

Seperti yang telah mereka lakukan untuk memanipulasi pikiran kita tentang uang kertas, kita dapat mengembalikan kebenaran dengan menggunakan uang emas. Karena itu, hati2lah menyimpan uang dalam jumlah besar / investasi dalam bentuk kertas. Banyak sekali jasa yang disediakan oleh bank-bank syariah untuk menabung dinar. Alangkah lebih amannya kita menyimpan harta yang kita miliki dalam bentuk dinar agar tidak terkena inflasi dan penurunan nilai.

The Logic of Peace Operations: Implications for Force Design

A starting point for determining the special military requirements imposed by peace operations is the question, What is the defining logic of such operations that differentiates them and war? A recent US Army manual on peace operations sees the following distinction:

In war, consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander. In peace operations, however, the level of consent determines fundamentals of the operation. ¹

Characteristically, peace operations involve (i) an action program or mandate to which the principal parties to a conflict consent, at least partially, and (ii) intervention by an agent not involved in the conflict that acts to monitor, facilitate, supervise, and/or enforce implementation of the action program -- in some cases because local consent to the program is insufficiently robust or self-sustaining. Robust or not, consent serves as the lever that enables the world community and its representative field force to achieve goals that would be unattainable otherwise, except at prohibitive cost. ²
Wars, by contrast, tend toward becoming bilateral affairs in which each side pursues the destruction of the other's military capability -- at least to the extent that the achievement of political goals requires it. Thus, the defeat, destruction, or incapacitation of some relevant portion of an opponent's military power is viewed as a necessary enabling condition for a program of political action. Wars could be said to have two moments: one military, the other political. Although the military moment should always serve and conform to the political, it is also distinct: Within a vector set by politics, it has its own immediate goal and measure of success, which is military victory.
Comparing peace enforcement operations to war, a US Army Infantry School white paper usefully notes that,

Settlement, not victory, is the goal of all peace enforcement operations. The measure of success will always be political, not military. ³

This view, of course, does not preclude the use of force by UN field units, however, as the US field manual notes, "When force must be used, its purpose is to protect life or compel, not to destroy unnecessarily; the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is the enemy." ⁴ This precept calls to mind the role of police, as it is conceived ideally. Consider the hypothetical example of police officers acting to quell an altercation. Depending on how the disputants respond to an order to desist, the officers may have to physically restrain, disarm, or even injure one or both. These acts do not, in themselves, make the officers a party to the dispute, even if events require them to focus their restraining power primarily on one of the disputants.⁵ Nor does it make the disputants "police enemies", whose capacity to resist must be broken utterly or whose cooperation is not desired and sought. Indeed, police interventions typically involve a mix of cajoling, warning, and force -- albeit with the threat of greater force (or trouble) held obviously in reserve.
Regarding peace operations, the least challenging scenario is one in which the parties to a conflict are mutually committed to ending hostilities and enacting a settlement, but remain suspicious of each other or worry that the close proximity of their fighting forces will spark an unwanted engagement. In this case, an outside agent may act to embody or facilitate the already existing consensus of the parties -- a circumstance that typifies simple or "traditional" peacekeeping operations. Here the analog for the outside force is a referee or mediator, not a police officer. In these cases, the deployment of "traditional" blue helmets -- armed lightly and only for self-protection -- will suffice.
More difficult are situations in which local political and military leaders exert only incomplete control over their combatant forces, or situations in which military and paramilitary forces are partially independent of central political control. The most demanding situations are those in which one or more of the warring parties have not yet completely resigned themselves to seeking their ends through peaceful means, and those characterized by a general breakdown in public order. In these cases, the main impetus for a peace operation may come from the broader community of states, who see a serious threat to regional peace or to humanitarian standards in the conflict or in its effects. ⁶
When momentum for the peace program originates outside the affected area, local consent may be uneven and grudging, perhaps resting partially on external inducements, sanctions, or the threat of sanctions. Indeed, in some cases combatants may agree to negotiate a program of conflict management, limitation, or resolution simply because doing so is the sole alternative they have to a more vigorous form of outside intervention. Where local consent is variegated and unstable, the peace operations force must be prepared to operate in an environment of potential hostility, which warring factions or groups may direct at each other, at the mandated action program and its representatives, or both.
If consent is the lever arm of peace operations, the fulcrum is the capability of the field force to protect itself and deter a descent into a general state of violence. ⁷ The field force combines this lever and fulcrum into a synergetic system through a doctrine that prescribes a defensive military stance and the discrete use of force at minimum necessary levels. ⁸
The "lever arm and fulcrum" system will not function if the fulcrum -- that is, the field force -- cannot protect itself or lacks sufficient strength to plausibly deter attacks. For this reason, the tactical units of the field force -- in this case, battalions and companies -- should closely resemble typical "middle weight" military units in their equipment and capabilities. This criteria should be applied with reference to a prototypical "worst case" threat for these types of conflict -- which means a military or paramilitary opposition employing, at best, mid-level technology and exhibiting low- to mid-levels of organization and professionalism.
The implication of the preceding discussion is that a UN legion will distinguish itself from a typical middle- weight force, such as the French Force d'Action Rapide, at the tactical and small-unit levels not by its equipment or combat capability as much as by its tactics and techniques of first resort -- presence, communication, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation, which imply special training and a high level of discipline and professionalism. On the theater level, however, the force would appear clearly different from one designed for warfighting. Peace operations do not encompass operational-level offensives. Nor should a peace operation field force be expected to erect a robust defense against protracted and intensive theater- wide military assault. Consequently, the capabilities associated with such missions are notably absent. In the instance of a large-scale offensive, these would include substantial reserves of heavy armor, deep-strike combat aircraft, and a preponderance of self-propelled long-range artillery under armor.

Peace Operations Mission Taxonomy and Field Functions

A review of typical peace operations missions will help us identify the structural characteristics of a suitable field force. Of special interest among these missions are the following: ⁹

• Preventive deployment to forestall violence between communities or states;
• Monitoring or supervision of a tense situation, stalemate, ceasefire, or settlement;
• Establishment, monitoring, or supervision of cantonment areas, demilitarized zones, or buffer zones between warring parties -- which may involve interposition by the field force;
• Support, supervision, or implementation of a process of disarming and demobilizing of the warring factions;
• Protection and support of humanitarian assistance efforts;
• Noncombatant evacuation under threat;
• Establishment of protective zones;
• Protection and support of national reconstruction and reconciliation efforts -- including the conduct of elections;
• Assistance in the maintenance and restoration of general civil order; and
• Enforcement of sanctions.

Several of these missions would require the field force to undertake the subsidiary missions of guarantee and denial of movement. This mission taxonomy provides a guide for deciding the structure and mix of field units for the proposed force. Missing from this list are those peace enforcement missions that clearly involve full-fledged war: for instance, theater-wide counter-offensive campaigns. As noted above, the proposed legion is not designed to undertake this type of campaign. (It is also worth noting that some of the missions listed above would not routinely require a force more capable than traditional "blue helmet" peacekeepers. In cases where lightly armed peacekeepers are both available and judged able to safely enact a UN mandate, the proposed legion should not be used in their place.)
The proposed legion is geared toward contingencies in which the threat of armed resistance is real and present. Beyond this, its specific structures conform to the "field functions" implied in the mission taxonomy. In this analysis, "functions" are routine activities that field units may have to undertake in the course of performing a mission. Identifying these functions is an intermediate step in designing a force structure that is suited to the achievement of mission objectives. With regard to the mission taxonomy presented above, relevant field functions include (i) observing, monitoring, and patrolling, (ii) protection, (iii) control, and (iv) defense. Observing and monitoring are functions that are often best suited to specialized reconnaissance and surveillance units -- cavalry. However, some forms of observing and monitoring imply static observation sites -- which can be staffed by infantry. Patrolling in detail -- that is, on foot -- can also count as a form of observing and monitoring and, it is a task for infantry.

Protection

Protection activities are also emphasized in the mission list. These may be usefully divided into several categories: protection of sites, protection of areas, and protection of UN-supported activities. Protection of sites -- such as government buildings or communication facilities -- can depend largely on infantry in a static mode. Protection of areas can range from regular patrolling (as a means of maintaining order and supporting site protection) to full-blown area defense. The latter encompasses the defense of protected areas (for instance, safe havens and force lodgements) against concerted raids or even massed assault. (Defense of protected areas is addressed separately below.) Area patrolling can involve either cavalry or dismounted infantry -- depending on geographical scope, terrain, and threat.

Protection of UN-supported activities -- such as electoral activities, humanitarian relief, or the conveyance of people or goods -- poses special problems. It often implies protection on-the-move through hostile or uncontrolled areas. Even when the protected activities are more or less stationary, they may be intermittent and scattered throughout a country, occurring both in areas that are closely controlled by the UN force and areas that are not. Protection of convoys requires cavalry -- not only in a guard role, but also in a screening role. The guard role involves providing protection up close; the screening role, forward reconnaissance and the spoiling of ambushes. Protection of activities that are relatively stationary -- for instance, food distribution from fixed sites -- may permit reliance on infantry. Nevertheless, should these protected activities be scattered and intermittent, operational mobility will be key.

Control

The peace operations mission taxonomy also implies a number of control functions for the field force. These efforts may involve requiring belligerents, the local populace, or both to behave in some prescribed fashion or to abstain from some proscribed behaviors. Control functions include, for instance, movement control or denial, area policing in support of civil order, interposition, search and seizure activities, or cantonment of belligerent forces and stockpiling of their weapons. These functions, unlike those in the protection category, require the field force to assume a proactive stance and interact with belligerents or potential belligerents in ways that might incur resistance or a violent response -- even assuming strict even-handedness and a high level of discretion and professionalism on the part of UN units.
The types of units required for control functions will depend, of course, on the specific control functions that an operation involves and the extent to which the belligerent parties consent to control. It will also depend on the tactical situation: the task of supporting law and order in a well-defined and limited area -- say, a city -- is much easier if well-organized belligerent groups are already effectively excluded from the area or have been co-opted into the policing function. Also, control functions are generally less challenging if they occur amid a high-density of friendly forces. This, because units can reinforce each other more easily, if necessary, under conditions of high force density. Some missions and functions, however, will require the field force to deploy relatively small or even very small packets across a large area. ¹⁰ Examples are (i) general movement control, which may require numerous, small checkpoints, (ii) the detailed disarming or supervision of warring parties, and (iii) the occupation for deterrent or "buffering" purposes of numerous, contested sites.
Because control activities are proactive and, in some cases, intrusive, they test the limits of local consent. The amount of leverage tactical units bring to such activities will depend on their resilience and fighting power. Resilience requires inter alia various means of passive self-protection -- armoring, defensive field preparations, and the wise choice of deployment sites -- some of which are not relevant in wide-ranging control activities. Regarding fighting power: tactical units on average should have at minimum a manifest capability to stalemate most units of comparable size that may oppose them. A margin of superiority is gained through unit cohesion, leadership, and skill and, at the operational level, through superior intelligence and command and control.
The criterion of adequacy is met fully if units are likely to produce a deterrent effect -- that is, if their manifest combat capability can dampen belligerents' eagerness for a fight. This capability must be clear on the tactical level -- if not in every contact between the UN force and the belligerent, which would be infeasible, then in most contact between units of company-size or larger. ¹¹ The desired deterrent effect cannot derive solely or primarily from "rapid reaction units" held in reserve on the operational-level or distributed throughout the field force. This, because in peace operations the challenge to deterrence too often originates suddenly and on the small-unit level, reflecting the poor discipline and weak command structure of belligerent "armies." To have any hope of deterring violence, field force units must be attuned to the perspective and calculus of lower-level belligerent commanders, who often act semi-autonomously.
Paying attention to the combat capability of UN field units should not imply that they will very often resort to arms in fulfilling their control functions. They are (or should be) oriented doctrinally to operate within a context of consent, which they work to preserve and reinforce through a discrete application of minimum necessary force. Providing these units with a deterrent capability down to the tactical level is meant to allow them to simultaneously fulfill their missions and avoid actual fighting. Consider the hypothetical example of a UN unit given the task of supervising the disarmament of a belligerent unit that is reluctant to comply despite the agreement of its higher-level political leaders: The UN unit might next choose to develop the situation by delaying or even blocking the egress of the recalcitrant unit while contacting higher authorities. Although this action is nonviolent, there is no doubt that it could elicit a violent response.
In other situations, the best course might be to permit some temporary "leakage" in the control regime -- for instance, by permitting a belligerent unit to pass a check point -- while striving to catch the leak farther down the line, perhaps through the political intervention of higher authorities. Sometimes the local balance of forces may compel a UN unit simply to step aside. Clearly, a UN infantry team staffing a transportation checkpoint could not contain a heavily-armed company-size unit that was determined to pass. Nonetheless, designing UN units to be strong on average for their size is worthwhile. The survival of the team in the preceding example might depend on it -- as might its capacity to delay the transgressor and communicate the problem to higher authorities in a timely way.
Field commanders cannot afford in any case to be sanguine about leakage in control regimes because the precedent will inspire repetition, thus increasing the likelihood of major confrontation. In sum, tactical weakness increases not only the dependence on operational reserves -- that is, quick reaction forces -- but also increases the likelihood that rapid reaction forces will have to be called into action, which is an eventuality that can put at risk the consensual basis for an entire operation.
Our analysis of control functions suggests that UN tactical field units should have higher average levels of protection, mobility, and firepower than can be achieved by pure infantry forces. Of course, in many situations foot infantry are indispensable. Operations in enclosed terrain require them; so do some tactics, such as house-to-house searches and intensive foot patrols. However, because peace operations tend to be low-force-density affairs and often require scattered deployments, the ability to quickly withdraw or redeploy infantry is essential. Thus, all infantry should be motorized, at least. In other words, troop transport should be organic to all tactical units.

Defensive Operations

Our overview of functional requirements concludes with an examination of defensive operations per se. The most demanding of potential defensive operations involve (i) protection of specified areas under chronic attack by well-equipped belligerent units and (ii) withdrawal or redeployment of the UN force while under concerted attack. Among the basic requirements for such operations are dedicated anti-armor assets, substantial artillery assets, and combat engineer capability (which is essential to countermobility operations and the construction of field fortifications). ¹² Generally speaking, the capacity of the UN force to defend itself will rest on (i) the baseline resilience, combat capability, and mobility of its tactical units -- which should be at least as good or better on average than that of the belligerents' units and (ii) the clear superiority of its theater C3I facilities. In a net assessment, the field force's margin of superiority derives principally from its better training, discipline, leadership, intelligence, and communication.

Both types of defensive operations mentioned above require that key weapons of the defense be mobile -- although mobility of artillery fire can substitute partially for mobility of units. The second type of operation -- a fighting withdrawal -- imposes high mobility requirements on all force elements. None must be left waiting due to lack of dedicated transport. A shortfall in this regard will not only extract a price at the moment of crisis: It can exert a drag on an operation from beginning to end as commanders seek to compensate for the vulnerability of the force. In such cases, UN units might be able to avoid becoming literal hostages, but only by allowing an entire operation to fall hostage in a political-strategic sense.

A fighting withdrawal requires high-mobility screening and covering units able to fight from successive positions and effectively delay and disrupt an attacker. Defense of safe havens may also require forward screens, although the bulk of "deeper" defensive actions is conducted by artillery and helicopter units. Tactical counter-attacks are an essential element of any defense. In the case of peace operations forces, these actions would be limited mostly to short, sharp engagements under artillery cover and with the immediate goal of convincing an attacking force to disengage. The purpose of such actions could be to rescue a friendly unit in crisis or relieve pressure on a safe haven perimeter.
The UN field force might also resort to smaller-scale counterattacks while performing its protection and control functions. Usually the aim would be to compel an attacker to desist, not to completely destroy the attacking units. In some cases, however, both the political freedom and tactical necessity to press a counterattack will exist. An example is counter-battery fire aimed at a belligerent's artillery that has been shelling a protected area.
Peace operations of the sort we have in mind for the proposed UN force would not include theater-wide or operational-level offensives or counter-offensives -- such as Desert Storm. Thus, although the field force needs, for the reasons outlined above, some counter-attack or "shock" capability, this capability would constitute a relatively small portion of the force. In our view, the most efficient way of providing this capability is by folding it into cavalry units, thus producing "light armored cavalry." Limits on offensive action also imply a reduced requirement for long-range, self-propelled artillery -- reduced, that is, relative to the numbers employed routinely in modern warfare. ¹³

Summary of Force Structure Design Guidelines

Summarizing the clearest and most important of the design guidelines suggested by the preceding analysis, a UN peace operations field force should:

• Have tactical units with higher levels of protection and firepower than is common for modern light forces;
• Comprise units that are mechanized or motorized; in the case of motorized units, transportation assets must reside at the battalion level or below;
• Possess a higher proportion of cavalry units than is common for modern forces of comparable size; A sizable portion of these assets should be equipped to fulfill the function of a small, lightly armored strike force; ¹⁴
• Possess dedicated anti-armor units employing vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles to compensate for a relative paucity of tanks;
• Possess a higher proportion of special intelligence and engineering assets than is common for a modern force of comparable size;
• Possess more artillery than has been common for peace operations forces, but much less artillery of the self-propelled armored variety than is common for modern mechanized forces;
• Require few attack helicopter assets -- but more helicopters of the armed scout and anti-tank variety than has been common in recent peace operations.

Notes

1. US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, final draft, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1994), Section 1, p 14.
2. Analyzing the subcomponents and permutations of "consent" is central to discussions of peace operations doctrine, generally, and to efforts to distinguish peacekeeping and peace enforcement, in particular. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra suggest a spectrum of consent based on how the belligerents, the local populace, and the UN force regard each other and the mandate. The British Army manual usefully distinguishes between consent on the operational and tactical levels -- or, "consent for" and "consent within" an operation. The latter (tactical) is often unstable, sometimes requiring the application of force to achieve mandated objectives. However, maintaining consent on the operational level enables the tactical use of force. Another important variable in the consent equation is the degree of international consensus supporting a mandate.

For analysis of these issues, see US Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, Section 1, pp 14-16; British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping, third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994, Section 2, pp 5-18; the British manual's principal author, Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," Survival (Autumn 1994); Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces"; Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead, McNair Paper No. 25; and, Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations."
3. The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion," US Army Infantry School White Paper in, Operations Other Than War: Peace Enforcement (Fort Benning, Georgia: USAIS, 1993), p 6.
4. US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, p vi.
5. The analogy of peace operations and police functions needs qualification. A field force with a peace enforcement mission may strive for the ideal status of a "policing agent" (albeit with a limited mandate), and yet never attain it. It is quite possible for an intervention force to act even-handedly in the pursuit of a mandated goal -- say, disarmament of a population -- and, nonetheless, earn the reputation of being partisan. This, because its mandated activity -- general disarmament, in this example -- may serve to level a playing field that otherwise favors one side in a conflict. As Kenneth Allard points out, "In societies where peacekeeping may be needed, the distribution of arms reflects internal power structures that can be expected to fight to maintain their position." In such cases, Allard asserts, "there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to combat." Police, by contrast, are asked to enforce laws that are supported, usually, by a strong social consensus, and they operate within a context of pervasive supporting institutions -- a context notably absent in most peace operations contingencies. For this reason the goals and the implementation of a mandate must take into account both local and international consensus, and must be sensitive to the marginal utility of each control step taken. With regard to the Somalia operation, Allard contrasts disarming the population in general and "simply controlling or confiscating the arms [that] may overtly threaten the peacekeeping force," which he sees as a "qualitatively different" in terms of practicability. Allard, Somalia Operations, pp 61-66 and 89-91.
6. Many observers have noted that in such situations there may be little "peace" to keep or enforce. This is a good argument for retiring the terms "peace enforcement" and "peace operations," which may convey false impressions about the nature of these operations. In fact, what they involve is conflict management, limitation, and resolution -- most often attempted without the full cooperation of all the parties to the conflict.
7. In describing consent as a "lever arm" we mean that it and its subsequent modalities -- such as, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation -- are the means by which the work of the operation gets done. In suggesting that the military capabilities of the UN field force constitute a necessary fulcrum, we recognize that the degree of local consent is actually limited. Ideally, the field force will serve in such circumstances as a compelling presence whose potential for combat will not have to be brought to bear. On the relationship between local consent and the use of force, see Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping"; and, John Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping."
8. In the eventuality of combat between UN and local belligerent units, the roles of lever and fulcrum are reversed on the tactical level: the UN unit's military capability becomes a lever with which a recalcitrant belligerent unit is "moved." Of course, a resort to force on the part of UN units can disturb the consensual basis of an entire operation. If the peace operation as such is to proceed, then the UN's tactical use of force must rest firmly on the fulcrum of a broader popular consent to the peace operation. This particular combination of consent and force will not work if the UN operation has failed to keep straight and cultivate the more generally appropriate relationship between consent and force: generally, consent and its modalities -- persuasion, mediation, etc. -- are the lever; military capability, the fulcrum. As Charles Dobbie writes, "[A] strong consensual peacekeeping framework at the operational level marginalizes opposition and facilitates the use of minimum necessary force." Dobbie, "A Concept for Post- Cold War Peacekeeping," p 145.
9. Mission taxonomies for peace operations can be found in US Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations; British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping, third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping," International Affairs, (July 1993), pp 451-464; Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," pp 116-118; and, Commander Martha Bills, USN, et al, Options for US Military Support to the United Nations (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992).
10. During the Somalia operations the US 10th Mountain Division's light cavalry squadron played a key role. After action reports noted that squadron operations "were characterized by extended communication distances, the need to cover large areas of responsibility, and continuous operations." Lawrence Vowels and Maj. Jeffrey Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," Armor< /i> (September-October 1994), p 28.
11. Of course, providing UN field forces with better protection and increased capability is not sufficient by itself to enhance their deterrent effect. Rules of Engagement are important, too. Any new capabilities will be tested by some belligerent, sooner rather than later. If the force enters the field governed by overly restrictive Rules of Engagement, local belligerents will soon expose its apparent strength as hollow.
12. Fixed-wing air power can also contribute significantly to defensive operations, of course. In cases where the aggressor has a capable air force, defensive air power may be essential. Nevertheless, we do not now propose the development of UN fixed-wing combat air units because (i) adding any significant complement of these would greatly increase cost and force complexity, and (ii) the reluctance of UN members to support mandated operations is focused presently on ground power contributions, not air power.
13. A force equipped to perform the functions outlined above in situations involving belligerents of middling capability would also have considerable offensive capability against smaller, lower quality forces. In rare cases the Legion might use this power in a concerted fashion. An example is a contingency in which a belligerent with limited capability and no popular base undertakes to routinely violate a mandate that is widely supported by both the local populace and other belligerents. This example assumes that a very substantial local majority views the belligerent in question as a "criminal" or mercenary element, and that no significant portion of the population views the belligerent as representing their interests. In such a case the UN force might act to disarm and disband the belligerent, and do so without upsetting the essential consensual basis of the operation. It is important to recognize, however, that political leaders have a limited capacity to make such determinations in a disinterested fashion. Hence, whenever the UN force targets a belligerent for this type of action, it is entering upon dangerous ground. Lest there be confusion: the effort to capture General Aideed during UNOSOM II does not meet the criteria set out above.
14. As noted earlier, a light cavalry squadron played an important role in US operations in Somalia, which fully tested the units operational mobility and flexibility. Such units cannot, however, also play the role of light "shock" or attack units. For this role a somewhat heavier type of unit is required -- one with some capability against armor. Even with regard to the pure light cavalry role -- essentially reconnaissance, screening, and convoy duty -- the Somalia experience suggests that current US units are too lightly armed and too lightly supported: "Somalia indicates ... that division light cavalry squadrons need to be more robust and self-sustaining." Vowels and Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," p 30.

Citation:
Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, "The Logic of Peace Operations: Implications for Force Design." Originally published in Vital Force: A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion, October 1995, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA.
http://www.comw.org/pda/webun.htm (September 1997)

What is Materialism?

Most academic philosophers these days will tell you, without hesitation, that they are materialists. Materialism asserts that everything is or can be explained in relation to matter. This would be straightforward enough if we had a clear and stable idea of matter. But do we?...  Unfortunately, we don’t. There have been big changes since Descartes introduced his version of the mind/body problem in the 17th century. Descartes argued that the essence of matter is extension, or to put it another way, that what makes something material is having a shape at some particular position in space. Mass and energy don’t enter his account at all. After a number of important intermediate stages, we have arrived at a picture that takes mass and energy to be central, that makes shape unnecessary, and makes position in space problematic. Since Einstein, many physicists have regarded matter as a ‘lumpy’ form of energy. And quantum physics, with its Uncertainty Principle and probability waves, severs any necessary connection between being material and having some particular shape at some definite location. A materialist influenced by Cartesian physics offers us a very different picture of the world than a materialist influenced by quantum mechanics. The point is that the laws of physics (or, rather, our versions of them) are open to change. This means that our current concepts of matter (mass and energy) may change as well.
If physics imposed logical constraints on these concepts — if it in some way limited their meaning or content — the problem might be solved. Materialism would then be the view that nothing exists which falls outside those constraints. But there are no such constraints. Or, rather, what seem to constrain physicists at one time are abandoned in another. After Einstein, no physicist thought that matter required a position in absolute space (as the Newtonians did). After quantum mechanics, few physicists thought that matter must be deterministic (as Einstein did). Now some physicists are seriously suggesting that matter can move backwards in time (as almost no one previously believed). The laws of physics get stranger every day and the only thing certain about the future of physics is that it will be decided by physicists. The physics of the future will not be bound by the physics of the present and certainly not by its metaphysics. As always, the physics of the future will let the philosophical chips fall where they may.
Perhaps we could say that matter is whatever physicists finally decide it is. But this reduces materialism to a blank check to be filled in when physics finally closes its book. To advocate materialism is now simply to pledge allegiance to physics’ final words (if any). Materialism is no longer a metaphysical doctrine. It is now the epistemological position that the methods of physics are such that they will finally map the structure of the universe.
Thus far we’ve been trying to understand what materialism asserts by looking for a clear and stable concept of matter. Maybe this is the wrong place to look. We might get further by thinking about all those spooky, ephemeral and esoteric things that materialism denies.
What are these things? Over the years, the targets have expanded. The main target of 17th century materialism was Descartes’ mental substance. Eighteenth and 19th century materialism was more ambitious, attacking both the supernatural in general (e.g., ghosts and magic), and religion in particular (e.g., immortal souls and divine intervention). The main targets of 20th century materialism expanded still further to include consciousness. These targets are very different but they have one important thing in common. In one way or another, they all challenge the idea that science is capable of producing a complete causal account of the universe. That is, they all claim that something outside the system of nature, as represented by science, either can have causal impact on the natural world, and/or can explain what we are and what will become of us. Let’s call the former ‘interventionism’ and the latter ‘exemptionism’.
The commitment to interventionism and exemptionism are obvious in the case of supernatural and religious phenomena. Gods, ghosts, witches and magicians intervene in the physical world by summoning forces and energy unknown to physics. Neither can immortal souls can be understood in terms described by science. The case of consciousness is less obvious but also strong. Despite nearly fifty years of concerted effort, states of consciousness have resisted all attempts at physical description. The difficulty isn’t hard to understand. The sensation of warmth, the taste of coffee, the sound of my voice in my head, have no quantifiable mass or energy and no actual location in physical space (we can’t open my head and find my headache). It is easy to think that they may be caused by the brain, but it is hard to think that they are the very same thing as what causes them. But if they are not identical, if experiences (as such) have causal power, they intervene in the material world just as gods and ghosts do. If a sensation of pain, considered just as such, just as an experience, can cause me to jump and shout, the laws of physics do not by themselves explain my jumping and shouting. That is why 20th century materialism takes consciousness to be a problem — especially the idea that conscious states can be causes of anything.
Where does this leave us? We tried to understand what materialism asserts by understanding what matter is. After all was said and done, we were left with the epistemological doctrine that matter is whatever physicists finally say it is. This appeared to rob materialism of all content as a metaphysical doctrine. So instead we tried to understand it in relation to what it denies. But our efforts have taken us nearly full circle. The only common features of the processes and entities that materialists have denied is that they are interventionist or exemptionist. That is, they challenge the view that physics can provide a complete picture of the world and our place in it. So our second attempt to understand what materialism asserts leads us to nearly the same place as our first. Materialism is just the epistemological view that the methods of physics can provide us with a complete account of how things are.
© Michael Philips 2003
Michael Philips is a professor of philosophy at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon. In his spare time he is a photographer and performance artist.

MAKNA ZIARAH DALAM PEMIKIRAN TASAWUF IBN ‘ARABI DAN RELEVANSINYA DENGAN KEHIDUPAN BERAGAMA MODERN

Mencermati pemikiran tasawuf Ibn ‘Arabi>, terutama dalam konteks pengalaman-pengalaman ziarah yang ia jalankan, sungguh terdapat suatu keunikan, khas, dan tampak berbeda dibanding dengan pemikiran tasawuf sufisufi lain. Tokoh sufi yang dijuluki al-syaikh al-akbar itu adalah salah satu—untuk tidak mengatakan satu-satunya—seorang sufi berpengaruh yang dalam laku spiritual tasawufnya melakukan perjalanan ziarah, baik kepada guru-gurunya, ke kota suci Mekkah, Madinah, Yerusalem, hingga ziarah ke suatu tempat yang oleh kebanyakan orang (pengertian umum) lazim diidentikkan ke ‘makam’ atau ‘kuburan’ seseorang. Ibn ‘Arabi bukanlah tipologi seorang sufi yang cukup mengandalkan hati (al-qalb) untuk berziarah ke suatu tempat. Meskipun hati menurut kaum sufi merupakan organ tubuh yang disiapkan Allah untuk melakukan kontemplasi dan penyatuan dengan Yang Mutlak, sehingga sangat mungkin dalam melakukan ziarah ke mana pun, dapat dijangkau lewat pengalaman mistiknya, namun Ibn ‘Arabi> melampaui persepsi yang demikian. Ia justru selain memang memfungsikan “indera sufistiknya” untuk berkomunikasi langsung dengan Yang Ilahi, tapi juga melakukanya secara fisikli, yaitu menempuh perjalanan ziarah yang sangat jauh, dari waktu dan tempat berbeda. Atas dasar itulah, penelitian ini berusaha menjawab teka-teki Ibn ‘Arabi> tentang apa sebenarnya makna ziarah baginya; mengapa ia melakukan ziarah; dan dalam konteks kehidupan beragama modern, berusaha mencari nilai relevansi pengalaman ziarah Ibn ‘Arabi> dengan zaman modern sekarang ini. Oleh karenanya, upaya untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan itu, sekaligus pula menjadi tujuan dari penelitian ini, yaitu dapat mengetahui makna ziarah dalam ajaran tasawufnya. Setelah itu, baru mencari nilai relevansinya dengan kehidupan beragama modern berdasarkan pengalaman-pengalaman ziarah menurut setidaknya tiga agama besar dunia: Kristen (Katolik), Yahudi, dan Islam. Bagi Ibn ‘Arabi, ziarah mempunyai fungsi yang sangat signifikan untuk meningkatkan kualitas kesufiannya. Di samping ziarah, yang memang identik dengan aktivitas berkunjung kepada seseorang yang telah meninggal atau ke tempat-tempat mulia, ia juga melakukan silaturrahmi kepada teman dan gurugurunya. Antara ziarah dan silaturrahmi, memang terdapat perbedaan terutama bila dilihat dari objek tujuannya, tapi Ibn ‘Arabi seringkali melakukannya secara serempak atau bersamaan. Dengan mencermati pengalaman-pengalaman ziarah Ibn ‘Arabi>, tampak adanya dua kategori ziarah yang ia lakukan, yaitu ziarah dalam arti fisik, seperti kunjungannya ke tanah suci Mekkah dan ziarah ke makam kuburan. Sementara ziarah dalam arti non-fisik atau metafisik, ia lakukan bersama makhluk-makhluk Allah yang gaib, dan termasuk pula saat ia melakukan mi’ra>j menaiki tujuh tingkatan langit. Berdasarkan pengalaman-pengalaman inilah ziarah bagi Ibn ‘Arabi> mempunyai makna setidaknya dua hal, yakni untuk memenuhi panggilan Ilahi, yang menurut pengakuannya, ia mendapat perintah langsung dari-Nya; dan dengan berziarah, menjadikan kualitas kesufian Ibn ‘Arabi semakin tinggi. Pengkajian terhadap makna ziarah Ibn ‘Arabi ini juga memberikan kesadaran bahwa aktivitas ziarah merupakan fakta dan fenomena sosial yang terjadi di semua agama. Ziarah spiritiul Ibn ‘Arabi membangunkan kesadaran umat beragama sekarang ini, adanya ziarah yang hanya berorientasi pada bisnis dan pariwisata (tour) semata. Sementara wisata yang lebih berorientasi pada religiusitas dan spiritual, sangatlah minim terjadi. Hasil pengkajian, sebagaimana dipaparkan di atas, tentu memerlukan ketekunan dalam melakukan analisa. Pelacakan terhadap ajaran-ajaran tasawuf Ibn ‘Arabi yang berkenaan dengan ziarah, tidaklah mudah dilakukan. Selain karena betapa rumit memahami bahasa yang ia gunakan di beberapa karyanya, juga tidaklah sistematis dan terkesan acak di lembaran-lembaran tulisannya. Untuk mengatasi problem ini, penulis menggunakan perangkat atau unsur-unsur metode: (1) Deskripsi, yakni dengan mengutip langsung pendapat-pendapat Ibn ‘Arabi>, (2) Interpretasi, digunakan untuk menafsir makna dari pendapatnya, dan (3) Komparasi, yang penulis gunakan untuk membandingkan pendapatnya itu dengan tokoh-tokoh sufi lain. Kemudian agar lebih jauh dalam memahami pemikirannya, penulis menggunakan pendekatan sufistik dan sosio-antropologis. Pendekatan sufistik dimaksudkan untuk menangkap secara empatik maksud dan tujuan filosofi pemikirannya tentang ziarah, yang itu merupakan bagian dari ajaran tasawufnya. Sedangkan pendekatan sosio-antropologis merupakan perangkat analisis yang digunakan penulis untuk mengurai fenomena ziarah sebagai fakta yang terjadi tidak hanya dilakukan oleh Ibn ‘Arabi, tapi juga oleh masyarakat luas di zaman modern. Penulis sengaja memilih pendekatan sosio-antropologis, karena hasil penjelasan dalam penelitian ini tidak menginginkan suatu uraian bercorak teologis, yang cenderung larut dalam perdebatan fiqhiyah soal boleh tidaknya seseorang melakukan ziarah.